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Abstract:-E-Commerce offers the banking industry great 
opportunity, but also creates a set of new risks and vulnerability 
such as security threats. Information security, therefore, is an 
essential management and technical requirement for any 
efficient and effective Payment transaction activities over the 
internet. Still, its definition is a complex endeavor due to the 
constant technological and business change and requires a 
coordinated match of algorithm and technical solutions. E-
commerce is not appropriate to all business transactions and, 
within e-commerce there is no one technology that can or should 
be appropriate to all requirements. E-commerce is not a new 
phenomenon; electronic markets, electronic data interchange 
and customer e-commerce. The use of electronic data 
interchanges as a universal and non-proprietary way of doing 
business. Through the electronic transaction the security is the 
most important phenomena to enhance the banking transaction 
security via payment transaction. 
Categories and Subject Descriptions: - 
Electronic commerce security, payment system, payment 
transaction security, payer anonymity, dual signature. 
General terms:- 
Electronic payment transaction security. 
Keywords:- 
E-Commerce transaction security, Banking Technology. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
An electronic payment transaction is an execution of a 
protocol by which amount of money is taken forms a payer 
and given to a payee. In a payment transaction we generally 
difference between the order information (goods or services 
to be paid for) and the payment instruction (e.g., credit card 
number). From a security perspective, these two pieces of 
information deserve special treatment. This paper describes 
some algorithm that can be used to implement the payment 
transaction security services. 
 
 
 
II. USER ANONYMITY AND LOCATION 
UNTRACEABILITY 
 
User anonymity and location untraceability can be provided 
separately, a pure user anonymity security service would 
protect against disclosure of a user’s identity. This can be 
achieved by, for example, a user’s employing pseudonyms 
instead of his or her real name. However, if a network 
transaction can be traced back to the originating host, and if 
the host is used by a known user only, such type of 
anonymity is obviously not sufficient. A “pure” location 
untraceability security service would protect against 
disclosure of where a message originates. One possible 
solution is to route the network traffic through a set of 
“anonym zing” hosts, so that the traffic appears to originate 
form one of these hosts. However, this requires that at least 
one of the hosts on the network path be honest, if the traffic 
source is to remain truly anonymous. 
 
A. Chain of Mixes:- 
   A user anonymity and location untraceability mechanism 
based on a series of anonym zing hosts or mixes has been 
proposed by D. Chaum [1]. This mechanism, which is 
payment system independent, can also provide protection 
against traffic analysis. The basic idea is illustrated in Fig. 
[2.1] messages are sent from A,B and C (representing 
customer wishing to remain anonymous) to the mix, and 
from the mix to X,Y and Z )representing merchant or banks 
curious about the customer’ identities). Messages are 
encrypted with the public key of the mix, EM., if customer a 
wishes to send a message to merchant Y, A sends to the mix 
the following construct: 
 
A      Mix:EM [Mix, EY (Y, Message)] 
 
  
Now the mix can decrypt it and send the result to Y: 
Mix      Y: EY (Y, Message)   
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Only Y can read is since it is encrypted with Y’s 
public key, EY. If the mix is honest, Y has no idea 
where the message originated or who sent it.  
The main drawback of the scheme is that the mix 
has to be completely trustworthy. 
 
If A wishes Y to send a reply, he can include an 
anonymous return address in the message to Y: 
Mix, EM (A) 
 In this way the reply message is actually sent to the mix, but     
only the mix knows whom to send it on to (i.e., who should 
ultimately receive it).  
 
 
 
An additional property of the mix scheme is protection 
against traffic analysis.  
 
This can be achieved by sending “dummy” message from A, 
B and C to the mix and from the mix to X, Y and Z. all 
messages, both dummy and genuine, must be random and of 
fixed length, and sent at a constant rate. Additionally, they 
must be broken into fixed block sizes and sent encrypted so 
that an eavesdropper cannot read them. The problem of 
having a mix trusted by all participant can be solved by using 
a matrix (or network) of mixes instead of just one, as shown 
in fig. [2.2]. in this case, only one mix on a randomly chosen 
path (“chain”) has to be honest.The bigger the matrix, the 
higher the probability that there will be at least one honest 
mix on a randomly chosen path. 
 
For a chain of mixes, let E, be the public key of Mix  
i = 1, 2, 3. A message is constructed recursively as follows: 
E Recipient (Next recipient, E Next recipient (…)) 
 
If a wants to send an anonymous and untraceable 
message to Y, as in the example with on mix, the protocol 
goes as follows: 
 
A     Mix1:   
 
              E1 (Mix2, E2 (Mix3, E3, (Y, Message))) 
 
Mix1      Mix2:E2 (Mix3, E3 (Y, Message)) 
 
Mix2      Mix3:E3 (Y, Message) 
 
Mix3            Message 
  
 
             
                       Fig-2.2 Chain of Mix 
 
Message” can additionally be encrypted with Y’s public key, 
which is omitted here for simplicity. The principal a can 
provide an anonymous return address in the same way as in 
the example with one mix. Specifically, A picks a random 
return path through the mix network (e.g., Mix2, Mix1) and 
encrypts his identity and address multiple times using the 
public keys of the mixes on the return path: 
Mix2, E2 (Mix1, E1 (A)) 
 
The recipient of the message (Y) can then send the message 
to the first mix, and from this point on it works in the same 
way as from A to Y. An implementation of the mix network 
would be expensive and complex from both the technical and 
the organizational points of view. There is an experimental 
implementation of anonymous e-mail with return addresses 
called BABEl by Gulcu and Tsudik [3], and onion network. 
 
III. PAYER ANONYMITY 
This is a simplest way to ensue payer anonymity with respect 
to the payee in for the payer to use pseudonyms instead of his 
or her real identity. If one wants be sure that two different 
payment transactions by the same payer cannot be linked, 
then payment transaction untraceability must also be 
provided. 
 
A. Pseudonyms 
The first internet payment system was based on the existing 
internet infrastructure that is e-mail, TELNET, S/MIME, and 
FINGER. Although they did not use cryptography at the 
beginning, they later realized that in some cases it was 
necessary. For example, authorization message exchanged 
between First Virtual and merchants before shipment must be 
protected to prevent large shipments to fraudulent customers. 
Under the First Virtual System, a customer obtains a Virtual 
PIN (VPIN), a string of alphanumeric which acts as a 
pseudonym for a credit card number. The Virtual PIN may be 
sent safety by e-mail. Even if it is stolen, an unauthorized 
A 
B 
C 
X 
Y 
Z 
MIX 
Fig. 2.1 Chaum’s Mix 
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customer cannot use it because all transactions are confirmed 
by e-mail before a credit card is charged. If some one tries to 
use a customer’s Virtual PIN without authorization, First 
Virtual will be notified of the stolen Virtual PIN when the 
customer replies “Fraud” to First Victual’s request for 
confirmation of the sale (Fig. 3.1) in such a case, the Virtual 
PIN will be canceled immediately. This mechanism also 
ensures confidentiality of payment instruction with request to 
the merchant and potential eavesdroppers. Fig. (3.1) 
illustrates a First Virtual (FV) payment transaction. A 
customer sends his order to the merchant together with his 
VPIN (1). The merchant may send VPIN authorization 
request to the FV payment provider (2). If the VPIN is valid 
(3), the merchant supplies the ordered services to the 
customer (4) and sends the transaction information to the FV 
provider (5). In the next step (6) the FV provider asks the 
customer whether he is willing to pay for the services (e.g., 
via e-mail). Note the customer may refuse to pay (“No”) if 
the services were delivered but do not fulfill his expectations. 
If the services were not ordered by the customer, he responds 
with “Fraud”. That aborts the transaction and revokes (i.e., 
declare invalid) the PIN. If the customer wants to pay, he 
responds with “Yes” (7). In this case the amount of sale is 
withdrawn from his account (8a) and deposited to the 
merchant’s account (8b), involving a clearing transaction 
between the banks (9)  
 
The payment transaction described above involves low risk if 
the services include information only. Even if a fraudulent 
customer does not pay for the services delivered, the 
merchant will not suffer a significant loss [4], and the VPIN 
will be blacklisted immediately, as mentioned before, 
cryptographically protected authorization message must be 
exchanged between First Virtual and merchant before large 
shipments. 
 
IV. PAYMENR TRANSACTION 
UNTRACEABILITY 
          Currently there is only one mechanism providing 
perfect anonymity and thus perfect payment untraceability. 
However, this mechanism (Blind signature) is used for digital 
coins. 
 
A. Randomized Has sum in SET 
A merchant also obtains only the hash sum of a payment 
instruction. The payment instruction contains, among other 
information like: Primary account number, PAN (e.g., credit 
card number):The card’s expiry date (Card Expiry);A secret 
value shared among the cardholder, the payment gateway, 
and the cardholder’s certification authority (PAN Secret);A 
fresh nonce to prevent dictionary attacks (EXNonce). 
Since the nonce is different for each payment transaction, the 
merchant cannot link two transactions even if the same PAN 
is used. 
B. Blind Signature  
D.Chaum [1] proposed a cryptographic mechanism that can 
be used to blind (obscure) the connection between the coins 
issued and the identity of the customer who originally 
obtained them. The mechanism, which provides both payer 
anonymity and payment transaction untraceability, are based 
on the RSA signature and is called a blind signature. This 
type of signature is called blind since the signer cannot see 
what he signs. The basic scenario is the same as in RSA: d is 
the signer’s private key, e and  n  are the signer’s public key. 
There is an additional parameter, k, called the blinding factor 
and chosen by the message (e.g., the digital money serial 
numbers) provider: 
 
 
                       Fig. 3.1 First Virtual’s Payment System 
 
 
Provider blinds the massage M: 
M = Mke mod n; 
 
Signer computers the blind signature: 
S’ = (M)d  modn = kMd modn; 
 
Provider removes the blinding factor: 
 S = S’/k = Md modn. 
 
This signer usually wants to check if the message 
M(e.g., a vote or digital coin) in valid. For this purpose the 
provider prepares n messages and blinds each one with a 
different blinding factor. The signer then chosen n-1 
messages at random and asks the provider to send the 
corresponding blinding factor. The signer checks the n-1 
messages; if they are correct, he signs the remaining 
messages. Note that electronic coins blinded in this way can 
only be used in  an online payment system. 
 
 
 
V. CONFIDENTIALITY OF PAYMENT 
TRANSACTION DATA 
 
Payment transaction date generally consists of two parts: the 
payment instruction and the order information. A payment 
instruction can contain a credit card number or an account 
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number. The primary purpose of protecting its confidentiality 
is to prevent misuse by unauthorized principal, including 
dishonest merchants. in many cases, however, the 
information contained in a payment instruction uniquely 
identifies the payer. Consequently, protecting it from 
unauthorized or dishonest principals also means protecting 
the payer’s anonymity. Although a payment instruction and 
order information must some times be made unreadable to 
different parties, there must still be a connection between 
them that can be easily verified by the customer, the 
merchant and the payment gateway otherwise, in a case of 
dispute, the customer could not prove that the payment 
instruction he sent to the merchant really related to a 
particular order.  
 
A. Dual Signature  
SET (secure electronic transaction) is an open specification 
for secure credit card transactions over open network. Its 
development was initiated by Visa and Master Card in 1996. 
SET uses the crypto technology of RSA Data Security, Inc., 
so it cannot be used without a license. There are other crypto 
libraries available that will work in the place of the default 
crypto library (BSAFE) To protect credit card number (or a 
customer’s payment instructions in general) from both 
eavesdroppers and dishonest merchant, SET employs dual 
signature. In additional, dual signature protects 
confidentiality of purchase order information with respect to 
payment gateway. In a simplified scenario, let   PI be the 
payment instruction and OI the order information. Let M be a 
merchant and P a payment gateway. We want the merchant 
M not to able to read the payment instruction PI, and the 
gateway P not to be able to read the order information OI. To 
achieve that, the customer computes the dual signature DS of 
the payment request. In other words, the customer C signs PI 
and OI intended for P and M, respectively, by applying a 
cryptographic hash function b() and his private key Dc from a 
public key algorithm: 
Customer computes: 
  
DS  =  DC (h(h(PI), h(OI))) 
 
 Since M is supposed to see OI only, and P to see PI 
only, they obtain the respective confidential part as a hash 
sum only: 
Merchant Receives: OI, h(PI), DS 
Payment Gateway Receives: PI, h(OI), DS 
However, they can both verify the dual signature DS. If P 
agrees, that is, if the payment instruction in correct and the 
authorization response is positive, it can sign PI. If M agrees, 
he can sign OI. In the SET protocol the customer sends PI not 
to the gateway directly, but to the merchant in encrypted 
from. It is encrypted by a symmetric encryption algorithm 
with a randomly generated secret key K. the secret key  is 
sent encrypted with the payment gateway’s public encrypted 
key,  EP, so that only the gateway P can read it: 
 
Customer Merchant: OI, h(PI), DS, EP(K), EK(P, PI, h(OI)) 
The merchant forwards all elements of this message except 
OI to the gateway within the authorization request. He 
additionally includes “his” version of h (OI) so that the 
gateway can verify that the link between PI and OI is correct. 
Otherwise the customer or the merchant could claim that the 
payment referred to a different order than originally agreed 
upon. Note that this mechanism also provides a kind of 
payment transaction untraceability. The payment gateway 
can link the payment made by the same customer, nut it 
cannot see what was ordered. The merchant can only link the 
payments with order information, but cannot know which 
customer is behind them, provide a nonce is used as long as 
the payment gateway and the merchant do not conspire, dual 
signature provides payment transaction untraceability with 
respect to the merchant. 
 
B. Digital Signature 
Digital Signatures provides information regarding the sender 
of an electronic document. The technology has assumed huge 
importance recently, with the realization that it may be the 
remedy to one of the major barriers to growth of electronic 
commerce: fear of lack of security. Digital signatures provide 
data integrity, thereby allowing the data to remain in the 
same state in which it was transmitted. The identity of the 
sender can also be authenticated by third parties.  
The most widely used type of cryptography is public key 
cryptography, where the sender is assigned two keys-one 
public, one private, the original message is encrypted using 
the public key while the recipient of the message require the 
private key to the decrypted the message. The recipient can 
then determine whether that data has been altered. However 
although this system guarantees the integrity of the message, 
it does not guarantee the identity of the sender (public key 
owner). In order to remedy this, a certificate authority is 
required In fig. 5.2 Juan mark (the sender) use his private key 
to compute the digital signature in order to compute the 
digital signature, a one way hashing algorithm may be used 
to first calculate a message digest, as is done by RSA. The 
message digest is an efficient way to represent a message, as 
well as being a unique number that can only be calculated 
from the contents of the massage. The sender’s private key is 
used at this point to encrypt the massage digest. The 
encrypted massage digest is what is commonly called a 
digital signature. A certificate authority (CA) performs the 
task of managing key pairs, while the verification of the 
person or entity bound to that key pair is initially ascertained 
at the time of application by the registration authority. 
 A certificate is issued by a CA and links an 
individual to entity or its public key, and in some case to its 
private key. Certification authority can offer different grade 
of certificate, depending upon the type of initial identification 
provided by the individual. 
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VI. FRESHNESS OF PAYMENT 
TRANSACTION MASSAGE 
 
This service protects against replay attacked. In other worlds, 
it prevents eve’s droppers or dishonest participants form 
reusing the messages exchange exchanged during a payment 
transaction. 
 
 
A. Nonce and time stamps  
         Freshness of messages can, in general, be ensured by 
using nonce (random numbers) and time stamps. To illustrate 
how they can be used in a payment transaction, here is a 
model based on 1KP [5] (Fig.-6.1). in the rightmost column 
of the figure, the names of the transaction messages are 
given. In 1KP there are five values that are unique for each 
payment transaction: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Transaction identifier, TIDM, chosen by the 
merchant; 
 Current date and time, DATE; 
 Random number, NONCEM, chosen by the 
merchant; 
 Random number, SALTC, chosen by the customer; 
 Random number, RC, chosen by the customer. 
The purpose of TIDM, DATE, and NONCEM is to ensure 
freshness of all payment transaction messages except the 
initiate message. All three values together are referred to as 
TRM. All transaction messages depend on SALTC and RC.  
The customer initiates the payment transaction by sending 
the initiate message. He uses a one-time pseudonym IDC 
The merchant responds with the invoice message. IDM is his 
identifier. The value of COM represents a fingerprint of the 
general transaction data known by all parties:] 
 
7COM = h (PRICE, IDM, TRM, IDC, hK (SALTC, DESC))h(.) 
is a collision-resistant one-way hash function, and hK (key,.) 
is a pseudorandom function The payment message is 
encrypted with the acquirer’s public key EA. the customer 
and the merchant negotiate PRICE and DESC (order 
information) before the initiate message. The acquirer can 
compute PRICE form the payment message that is forwarded 
to it since it encrypted with its public key EA. However, it 
never learns DESC, since the protocol ensures confidentiality 
of order information with respect to the acquirer. PI is the 
customer’s payment instruction containing, of example, this 
credit card number and the card’s PIN. 
The Auth-Request (Authorization Request) message basically 
contains the invoice and the payment messages. {Message} 
denotes the contents of the previously sent Message. The 
value of hK (SALTC, DESC), together with COM, establishes 
a connection between the payment instruction and the order 
information. The authorization response from the acquirer 
and can be positive (yes) if the credit card can be charged or 
negative (no). the whole Auth-Response message is signed 
by the acquirer (DA).The merchant forwards the Auth-
Response message to the customer. CERTA is the acquirer’s 
public key certificate. It can usually be retrieved online from 
a public directory. 
 
VII. AVAILABILITY AND RELIABILITY 
 
Apart form needing to be secure, an electronic payment must 
be available and reliable. It must be available all the time, 
seven days a week, 24 hours a day. It must also have some 
protection against denial-of-service attacks, or at least be able 
to detect them early and start recovery procedures. To ensure 
reliability, payment transaction must be atomic. This means 
they occur either entirely (i.e., completely successfully) or 
not all, but they never hang in a unknown or inconsistent 
state. Furthermore, the underlying networking services as 
well as all software and hardware components must be 
sufficiently reliable. This can be implemented by adding 
redundancy (i.e., deliberate duplication of critical system 
components). Static redundancy uses n versions of a 
component (i.e., a function) with “m out of n voting” based 
on diversity. For example, with n-version programming, at 
least m versions must “agree” on a result to be accepted by 
the system as valid. With dynamic redundancy, detection of 
an error in one component will cause switching to a 
redundant component. These techniques are common to 
many software and hardware systems. Reliability additionally 
requires certain Fault tolerance mechanisms, including stable 
storage and resynchronization protocol for crash recovery. 
 
 
Message 
Digest 
Algorithm 
Public 
Key 
Algorithm 
 This is Juan Mark 
Public Key 
Juan Mark CA’s 
Signature  
               
 
          
Digital 
Signature 
 The owner of key 
pair. 
 The organization of 
the owner. 
 Their public key. 
 Expiration 
information. 
               Fig. 5.2 Digital Signature Process 
Certification Authority  
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VIII.CONCLUSION 
  
E-payment system are proliferating in banking, retail, 
healthcare, online markets, and even in government –in fact, 
anywhere money needs to change hands. Organizations are 
motivated by the need to deliver products and services more 
cost-effectively and to provide a higher quality of services to 
customer. Operating over the internet provides online banks 
with new potentialities, but also creates a set of new risks that 
many malicious actors are expected to use for their illegal 
activities. Information security, therefore, is an essential 
management and technical requirement for any efficient and 
effective payment transaction activities over the internet. This 
paper analyze to provide a mechanism for different 
transaction algorithm in e-commerce to secure the online 
transaction system the pay anonymity, digital signature and 
dual signature etc. is the best algorithm for such type of 
transaction the e-commerce security system is today need and 
demand in every where like a banking, or other business area 
and world wide online transactions. Now analysis of this 
paper gives secure transaction security for online payment 
system.   
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